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THE WISDOM AND MORALITY OF PRESENT-DAY
CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Joshua Dressler∗
First, let me just say how much I have enjoyed being on campus
these last two days. I thank the Dean, the criminal law faculty, and the
students who have participated in the classes I have taught here these
two days. And, I most especially want to thank Professor Margery
Koosed who worked exceptionally hard pulling everything together. I
will only say that she is a real “mensch” and if you need me to translate
that, I will gladly do so after this lecture. In short, I have greatly enjoyed
being here.
Today I want to talk about criminal sentencing and its connection,
or I fear lack of connection, to basic principles of punishment that are
supposed to make our system rational and morally just. Let’s keep in
mind that, everyday, in courts all over the country, judges are sentencing
persons to prison. They are doing that in our name. Punishment—
sentencing people to prison—involves intentionally inflicting pain on
persons by denying them liberty, which we all value, and separating
them from their community. Certainly, we need to care about why we
do this, to be sure there are justifications for treating people this way.
Now I think we know that there are two general theories or
justifications for punishment and sentencing. First, utilitarianism.
Utilitarians believe that the purpose of all laws is to maximize the net
happiness of society. Laws, all laws, should be used to exclude as far as
possible all painful or unpleasant events. To a utilitarian, both crime and
punishment are unpleasant and therefore, generally speaking,
undesirable. In a perfect world we wouldn’t have crime or punishment.
It isn’t a perfect world, of course, and there are people disposed to
commit crimes. Therefore, utilitarians believe that the infliction of pain
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in the form of punishment is justifiable if, but only if, it is expected to
result in a net reduction of pain of crime that otherwise would occur.
The second primary justification for punishment and sentencing is
retribution. Retributivists believe that punishment is justified when it is
deserved. It is deserved when the wrongdoer freely chooses to violate
society’s rules. To an uncompromising retributivist, the wrongdoer
should be punished whether or not it will result in a net reduction of
crime. This act of punishment is required, to retributivists, because of
the moral desert of the wrongdoer.
Now, the debate between retribution and utilitarianism applies on
different levels. I think, probably, that most people today would say that
the basis for our criminal justice system—that is, the reason why the
legislature defines crimes, why the police try to arrest those who
committed the crimes, and why we developed a court system to
adjudicate and impose punishment for those crimes—is primarily
utilitarian, not retributivist. We have defined the crimes, for example
murder, not because we want to go out and punish murderers, but
because we hope the threat of punishment will cause people not to
murder in the first place.
On the other hand, if one looks carefully at the rules of criminal
law, the rules you learn in law school—the requirement that a person not
be punished in the absence of voluntary conduct; the requirement of
mens rea, a guilty mind; and when one looks at the various defenses to
crimes—are far easier to explain pursuant to retributive principles than
utilitarian ones. In other words, once we set up the criminal justice
system, perhaps on utilitarian grounds, the determination of who should
be punished, namely only those who act voluntarily with a guilty mind
and without justification or excuse, and in determining how much
punishment is just, retributive justice is the key. This means that ideally,
in a just system, the punishment we potentially inflict for violations of
the law should only occur if, first, the wrongdoer caused harm to society,
and second, he or she morally deserves to be punished. Here, then, we
turn to the subject for today, sentencing.
The amount of punishment we impose should be roughly
proportional to the crime, taking into consideration the harm the person
caused and his or her moral blameworthiness in causing it. Now having
said that, this does not mean that utilitarianism has no role in sentencing.
One scholar, the late Norval Morris, felt that retribution and
utilitarianism could and should work together. His basic point was this:
retributivists cannot tell us exactly how much punishment is
proportionate to a crime. I mean, how many years of punishment are
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proportionate to a robbery, or a rape? Is it 5 years, is it 14 years, is it 7.2
years? We can’t answer that question precisely, if we are retributivists.
But retributivists can set parameters. We know intuitively that a certain
amount of punishment is too much for a particular crime, and that some
punishment is too low because it trivializes the offense. That sets your
retributive parameters: you impose no fewer than X number of years for
a particular crime, but no more than Y number of years for the offense.
Within those parameters, Norval Morris would argue, if a society
wishes, it can choose to apply utilitarian considerations—weighing
deterrence, rehabilitation, incapacitation—but retribution set the
parameters. Now I, Joshua Dressler, might prefer to exclude all
utilitarian considerations, but certainly a legislator has every right if he
or she chooses to apply utilitarian factors, but retribution should set the
top and bottom limits.
The problem is there is little evidence that lawmakers set penalties
in this sort of coherent manner. Typically, lawmakers apply no theory of
punishment at all in setting penalties. They apply the “What do I need to
get re-elected?” principle. And it is always easier to appear to be tough
on crime than to develop sensible penalties. This process of increasing
penalties, and then increasing them some more, and then increasing them
again—despite all utilitarian or retributive arguments to the contrary—
has been going on in the United States for at least the last quarter century
in a manner that should put this country to shame. In 2001, nearly two
million men and women were in the United States penal system. That is
a per capita rate of 690 persons per 100,000 population. That compares
690 per capita, to a 79 per capita rate as recently as the mid-1970s. In
other words, we have experienced a 900% increase in the incarceration
rate in this country in the past thirty years. There is simply no utilitarian
or retributive justification for this momentous change.
Nowhere, perhaps, are sentencing rules worse than in the federal
system. As a result of sentencing “reforms” in the 1980s, and I put
quotation marks around the term “reforms,” we now have the much
reviled Federal Sentencing Guidelines, hundreds of pages long, that
require a federal judge to proceed through a complex seven-step
sentencing process that ultimately leads to a Table at the end that tells
judges basically what sentence they should impose. Supposedly, the
Guidelines follow largely retributive principles. In actuality, they do
not.
First, the essence of retribution, the expression of moral
condemnation, has been largely lost because of the Guidelines. Let me
read a quote from Professor Kate Stith and Judge José Cabranes, who

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005

3

Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 4, Art. 9
DRESSLER1.DOC

856

5/2/2005 9:00:00 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[38:853

have observed that before guidelines existed, observers of sentencing
proceedings in federal courts:
witnessed a ritual of undeniable moral significance. . . . The
audience included victims, their families and friends, the family
and friends of the defendant, the general public. . . . But the
judge addressed only one person when imposing a sentence. . . .
This solemn confrontation was predicated on the fundamental
understanding that only a person [here, a judge] can pass moral
judgment, and only a person can be morally judged.1
But under the Guidelines, the judges have little discretion; they just
have a mechanistic seven-step process for calculating a punishment.
They may as well be a calculator as a judge. As Judge Cabranes and
Professor Stith go on:
The guidelines have replaced the traditional judicial role of
deliberation and moral judgment . . . with complex quantitative
calculations that convey the impression of scientific precision
and objectivity. The judge on the elevated bench remains a
visible symbol of society’s moral authority, but the substance
and meaning of this ancient staging is gone in most cases. . . .
With a far more limited role, the federal trial judge in today’s
sentencing ritual has little or no opportunity to consider the
overall culpability of the defendant before him. The Guidelines
themselves determine not only which factors are relevant (and
irrelevant) in criminal punishment, but also, in most
circumstances, the precise quantitative relevance of each factor.2
In short, the essence, the core of retribution, which requires that we
look not just at the harm caused, but also at the very individualized
factors relating to the defendant’s moral culpability, are gone —in favor
of a system that fails to treat the defendant as unique, and instead treats
the defendant as a member of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be
subjected to a set of entirely depersonalized guidelines.3
1. KATE STITH & JOSÉ CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE
FEDERAL COURTS 81-82 (1998).
2. Id. at 82-83.
3. Since I gave this address, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional aspects of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005). The effect of
Booker is that the Guidelines are now advisory to the judges, and not mandatory. Id. at 757. Judges
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And, as bad as these Guidelines are, they have been made far worse
in the last twelve months as a result of the so-called Feeney
amendments.4 In April 2003, Congress sharply limited further the
authority of federal judges to issue what are referred to as “downward
departures.” After a judge goes through the seven-step process, he or
she arrives at the Guidelines Tables. The judge is told there what
sentence ought to be imposed. But, the Guidelines permit judges some
limited authority to go below or above the figures set out in the Tables,
if their reasons for departure can be justified pursuant to specific
Guideline rules. The new amendments to the Guidelines, however,
provide that judges may not issue downward departures based on a
convicted defendant’s family circumstances or family responsibilities, or
because the defendant suffers from diminished capacity, if the defendant
has been convicted of a sexual offense or a crime against a minor. The
new law further directs the United States Sentencing Commission, which
has the responsibility to update the Guidelines, to promulgate
amendments that ensure that the incidents of downward departures are
substantially reduced. And, meanwhile, there is no such rule or
recommendation regarding upward departures: there, the judges are not
limited by the new amendments. Furthermore, the new legislation
permits the Attorney General of the United States to monitor the
downward departure rates of individual judges. Accordingly, Attorney
General John Ashcroft issued an amendment to the United States
Attorney’s Manual, the manual that every federal prosecutor in the
United States must follow, requiring prosecutors to report to the
Department of Justice whenever a federal judge issues a sentence falling
below the sentencing guidelines. The clear message the Attorney
General is sending is that factors regarding the defendant that might call
for mitigation, might call for compassion, are essentially factored out of
the Guidelines, either expressly or practically now that the Attorney
General is looking over the shoulders of the federal judges. In no way,
in other words, can we say that defendants will likely get their just
deserts—punishment truly representative of their personal
blameworthiness.
Finally, you must add to all of this, a spate of mandatory minimum
now have much greater freedom, post-Booker, to impose sentences they believe are appropriate. It
is too soon to know to what extent judges, instructed by the Booker Court to consider seriously the
now-advisory Guidelines, will diverge from them. And, of course, Booker invites Congress to reenter the picture: whether they will do so remains an open question; and if they do become
involved, it is unclear whether Congress will seek to enhance or diminish judicial discretion.
4. But see, supra note 3.
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sentencing provisions enacted by Congress: these are laws that prohibit
federal judges from imposing sentences below a very high minimum
number of years of imprisonment, thus reducing judicial discretion
further.5
In light of all of this, federal sentencing laws, and state sentencing
systems to the extent they are modeled after the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, are in clear violation of both utilitarian and retributive
values.
Not only are defendants punished more than they deserve under any
decent retributive system, and far more punishment than is necessary for
utilitarian purposes, but there are a number of negative side effects.
First, the Guidelines now result in punishment so grossly
disproportionate that some judges are rebelling. A few judges have
resigned their lifetime positions rather than continue to impose what they
consider to be draconian sentences. At least one judge threatened to tell
a jury in the guilt phase of a trial what sentence the judge would be
required to impose if the jurors convicted, essentially inviting jurors to
nullify the law and acquit. There have been a few stories of juries who
have nullified the law on their own and acquitted because a particular
juror either knew or thought he or she knew what the sentence was going
to be, and convinced the other jurors to acquit. Thus, people who are
genuinely guilty of crimes may be acquitted simply in order to avoid
draconian sentences. That is no way to run the criminal justice system.
There is another negative side effect that few people realize, except
those that are in the criminal law practice. The substantive criminal law
recognizes few excuses, and those excuses, like insanity, are very
narrowly defined. Now, overall, I happen to think that is good, that we
ought to recognize few excuses. I think most people are morally
responsible for their actions and therefore deserve to be convicted of
crimes they committed. But to say that someone deserves to be
punished is not the same as saying how much punishment they deserve.
There are factors that should have no place in the guilt phase of the trial,
but are perfectly appropriate in the sentencing phase to decide whether
the convicted defendant deserves full or less punishment. But, in any
sentencing system that bars mitigating evidence, or which makes it
exceptionally hard for a judge to take such factors into consideration, the
ultimate real world practical effect is that defense lawyers have no

5. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005), in no way invalidates mandatory minimum laws. Indeed,
Congress may be tempted to add more such laws to reduce judicial discretion and to counteract
Booker.
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choice but to raise such claims, claims that belong in the sentencing
phase, in the guilt phase in order to push courts to expand the number of
excuses recognized in the law—to create new excuses, or to make the
current excuses broader. When sentencing provisions fail to allow
judges to consider morally relevant factors in sentencing, it is inevitable
that any good and ethical defense attorney will try to squeeze such
claims into the only other place available, the guilt phase of the trial.
But, such efforts delay the trial process and may ultimately distort the
law. We may end up creating defenses when really we shouldn’t.
Again, we can’t blame the defense attorneys for making such claims
when they are effectively prevented from doing so at sentencing.
In short, we have every reason for being deeply dismayed by the
sentencing provisions in the federal courts. Although most state
sentencing systems are not as distorted as the federal system, I think it is
fair to say that virtually all state legislators nationwide are guilty of
following the “I am tough on criminals” approach to sentencing, rather
than developing sentencing provisions that are rational under utilitarian
theory, or humane under retributivist theory. Again, I start with what I
said in the beginning: these sentences that are imposed in Ohio courts,
Michigan courts, federal courts, occurring in our name. And if the
sentences are irrational, or if they are unjust and immoral, we are
responsible. Quite starkly, we are not providing justice.
Now, I want to add a few additional remarks about another aspect
of sentencing: sentencing people to death. I think it is fair to say that
there are few modern issues, and almost certainly none in the field of
criminal justice, that are deeper, more provocative, more troubling, and
more controversial than the question of whether and when our society
should execute persons convicted of first degree murder.
The
constitutional issues are well settled: the death penalty is not
unconstitutional per se. None of the nine justices currently serving on
the Court disagree with that statement. The issue today relates to
nonconstitutional issues, the wisdom and/or morality of the death
penalty. So, in the few more minutes that I have remaining, I would like
to reflect on those matters, on the wisdom and morality of the death
penalty. I stress I am only reflecting. Many of you may disagree with
what I have to say.
I want to start the same way as I started my earlier talk, and that is
on the justifiability of the death penalty. That has to be considered,
again, by considering the two basic theories of punishment. Usually we
ask two questions: Is the threat of the death penalty a general deterrent
and/or is the actual infliction of the death penalty retributively justified?
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First, general deterrence. In 1976, when the United States Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of the death penalty, that very same
Court on that very same day observed, and I am quoting the Court now,
“[T]here is no convincing empirical evidence either supporting or
refuting this view [that is, that death is a significantly greater deterrent
than lesser penalties].”6 Since 1976, nothing has changed, except that
almost every study since then seems to support the conclusion that it is
not a general deterrent. It is probably fair to say that the consensus
among criminologists today is that there is no scientific basis for the
claim that the death penalty is a general deterrent.
But here is the gist of the point. To utilitarians, pain, whether in the
form of crime or punishment, is bad, unless its infliction results in a net
reduction of future pain. In other words to a true utilitarian, the burden
of proof is on those who would impose the death penalty and its
resulting pain, and not on those who would abolish this punishment.
Until we have good reason to believe that the death penalty deters more
successfully than life imprisonment, until we have that evidence from a
utilitarian perspective, we shouldn’t defend the death penalty.
But that is hardly the end of the discussion on capital punishment,
because I don’t believe most proponents of the death penalty rely on
deterrence for their position. I think most people want to ask and answer
the second question, is the death penalty retributively justified? At first
blush, it is hard to argue with a claim that killers deserve the death
penalty. If one believes in the literal biblical principle of lex talionis, of
an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, killing a killer seems deserved.
But I am going to suggest that is too simplistic a response. Here’s why:
First, few of us really believe in lex talionis. We don’t really believe we
should rob the robber, rape the rapist and steal from the thief. If we
don’t believe in that, then we have rejected lex talionis, and thus there is
no reason to believe that the only answer to a murder is to kill the killer.
What lex talionis in our modern society really means is that
punishment should be proportionate to the offense committed, not that it
must be identical. That is, retribution only requires that the most serious
offense receive the most serious punishment, the least serious offense
receive the least serious punishment, and so on. If we can agree that
murder is the most serious offense in the penal code, then this only
means that we must impose on murderers the most serious punishment
that we as a community are prepared to impose, no less and no more.
But there is no retributive requirement that the most serious punishment
6. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 185 (1976).
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we, as a community are prepared to impose, be death. It cannot fairly be
claimed that those states that reject the death penalty are not punishing
their murderers sufficiently under retributive grounds. As long as we are
prepared to say that we are not required to impose lex talionis simply for
the sake of equality, then it follows that if the harshest punishment that a
particular community is willing to bear is life imprisonment without
possibility of parole, then that imposition, that harshest of all
punishments, is retributively proper. We certainly do not trivialize the
seriousness of murder by imposing life in prison.
But we still might ask is anything short of death really enough? I
have lived in a number of states in my life. I have lived in death penalty
states, my home state of California and here in Ohio, and I have lived in
nondeath penalty states, Minnesota and Michigan. If you carefully
listen, as I have, to families of murder victims, what they almost always
say in every state is that what they want is justice for their loved one.
Now “justice” doesn’t have to mean kill, it means, “treat my loved one
with respect,” which we do when we say to a convicted killer, “You
have committed the most heinous crime on our books. We will therefore
impose the most severe punishment that we impose in our community.”
If you talk to family members, for example in Minnesota, what you
typically find is that they are satisfied, they feel their needs are met,
when the murderer receives that community’s, Minnesota’s, most severe
punishment of life imprisonment. The victim’s family feels its loss has
been properly recognized by the community and by their neighbors,
because that is as far as Minnesota is prepared to go. The family
members say, in essence, “Okay, you have imposed the most severe
penalty available in our community. That is all I can ask.”
It is claimed, however, by some that we must execute the killers for
the sake of the families of the victims, to give them emotional closure
when the murderer is put to death. It is said that such closure does not
occur if we only sentence the defendant to life in prison. Here I would
like to quote Larry Marshall from Northwestern University, from an
article to be published next week in the Ohio State Journal of Criminal
Law. It is a long quote but I would like to read it to you because it is so
much on point to this issue. He writes:
[T]he claim is made that executions are essential for the families
of some murder victims to heal. This assertion is often
advanced by family members themselves, and there is a natural
resistance to challenge the thesis for fear of appearing callous or
insensitive to the views of the victims who have suffered so
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much pain. To the extent that important public policy issues are
at stake, though, it is essential to subject the healing/closure
argument to critical analysis. We should do this with great
sensitivity and compassion for those who have been victimized.
Nonetheless, we must conduct the inquiry rigorously. . . . That
sober inquiry reveals that the goals of promoting healing among
the families of murder victims cannot justify the continued use
of capital punishment. There is simply no evidence that
executions deliver on their promise of promoting the
psychological welfare of murder victims’ families. . . . [T]here is
no evidence that families of murder victims in non-death
states . . . endure more lasting pain than families of murder
victims in death states such as . . . Ohio. Remember also that
only two percent of all murderers are punished with the death
penalty, even in death penalty states. If we really believed that
executions were essential to the well-being of victims’ families,
how could we betray these other 98% by depriving them of
healing? Not one study of which I am aware, [Marshall writes],
has ever found that the psychological health of families in cases
in which executions have been imposed is better than in cases in
which life sentences are imposed.7
Basically, we give these terribly hurt families the promise that
execution will lead to closure, and then, after execution, it isn’t there.
The horrible reality is that people never totally get over what happened,
whether the killer is executed or sentenced to prison for life. And if you
think about it, if emotional closure is supposed to happen only upon
execution, then this means that when the murderer is convicted there is
no emotional closure: family members must wait for the “closure” of the
execution. But how long must they wait? They must wait years and
years and years—and it will always take years to execute murderers
because of the right of defendants to appeal, and the difficulty in finding
attorneys to represent them on appeals. Closure can’t even start, then,
for eight or ten or more years. And then they see the execution, and they
still don’t have closure. At least with life imprisonment, the moment the
person is convicted and sent off to prison for the rest of his life, the
family members know nothing more is going to happen. They need not
wait for an execution. Whatever closure can happen, can start
7. Lawrence C. Marshall, The Innocence Revolution and the Death Penalty, 1 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 573, 582-83 (2004).
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immediately. The family can start to resume your life. Do they heal?
Tragically, no. They don’t heal either way.
Let me move on to two final and related reasons why executing
killers ought to give us all pause, even those who are otherwise in favor
of the death penalty. And both relate in some way to innocence. As you
may know, mandatory death penalty statutes, that is, statutes that
provide that all first degree murderers must be executed, were declared
unconstitutional in 1976 by the same Supreme Court that otherwise said
the death penalty is constitutional.8 The law is that only “the worst of
the worst” may be executed. But I am going to submit that that is not
just a constitutional principle, it is a moral and retributively required
principle—only the worst of the worst should be executed. Let me read
one paragraph to you from the Supreme Court. The justices said in
terms of the Constitution, that there must be:
particularized consideration of relevant aspects of the character
and record of each convicted defendant before the imposition
upon him of a sentence of death. . . A process that accords no
significance to [such factors] excludes . . . the possibility of
compassionate or mitigating factors stemming from the diverse
frailties of humankind.9
And here we have the essence, the Court says “it [meaning a system
that would justify the death penalty for all murderers] treats all
persons . . . not as unique human beings, but as members of a faceless,
undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the
penalty of death.”10
Ultimately, this is the significant point under retributive principles:
punishment should be proportional to the offense. But “offense” means
not just the social harm caused, killing a person, but the personal moral
blameworthiness of the person that caused the death. As we all know,
we don’t execute a person simply because A killed B. We don’t say
“You caused a death. Therefore we will take your life.” We don’t even
convict people of crimes simply because A killed B. A may have killed
B justifiably in self-defense, or A may have killed B excusably because
of insanity. And even when we do punish, the law, as we all know,
distinguishes between a person who intentionally kills, and, say, a
8. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (stating “mandatory death sentence
statute[s] violat[e] the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and therefore must be set aside”).
9. Id. at 303.
10. Id.
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person who negligently kills. They caused the same harm, but we draw
a distinction because of the difference in moral culpability. And even
between two intentional killings we draw a distinction. The intentional
killer who premeditatedly and coldly killed is guilty of first-degree
murder. The person who intentionally kills as a result of adequate
provocation is convicted of manslaughter. Or, and now we get to the
point on the death penalty, we do not, or should not, execute killers, even
intentional killers, if there are aspects of that person’s life, character, or
circumstances that should cause us to believe that mercy, compassion, or
justice commands that we spare that person’s life.
It may be that this person, although legally sane, and therefore
responsible for his actions, suffers from a mental illness, or has a very
low IQ, or simply has lived such a horrible life of abuse as a child or an
adult, that killing them doesn’t seem morally necessary. The late
professor John Kaplan, who was a federal prosecutor, once observed:
[T]he more closely one examines their backgrounds [that is, of
most capital murderers] and what has happened to them as they
were growing up, the less one feels that it is morally necessary
to kill them. . . . Though we certainly do not want anything to
do with them, there appears to be no moral requirement that we
injure further one whose humanity has been so diluted over the
years by past injuries.11
All of these distinctions that I have laid out add up to this general
point: not all murderers deserve to be killed. Before we kill a person, we
are obligated to look deeply, beyond even the facts of the crime, to
determine who this person is, to look, if you will, into his or her soul and
determine whether this human is so evil, and whether this person is to
blame for that evilness, that taking this individual’s life is morally
justified. If the answer is no, if that person doesn’t meet that level of
evilness, then we might call him “death penalty innocent,” even though
he is guilty of murder.
And once we accept that we must draw these distinctions,
constitutional and moral, we have two other questions to answer. First,
do any of us in this room have the capacity to make that judgment?
Many of you will disagree with me when I say that my answer is “no, we
do not.” Jurors are being asked to punish as if they were God. One
thing I am sure of is that jurors are not God.
11. John Kaplan, The Problem of Capital Punishment, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 555, 567 (1983).
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Second, even if you do believe that humans are capable of making
these God-like moral judgments, we have to ask: Does our criminal
justice system, does our trial process, provide us with the requisite
assurance that jurors will be able to distinguish the “death penalty
innocent” from the others? Those who know how the criminal justice
system really works know that in most counties in the United States,
indigent defendants—and, let us be clear on this, it’s virtually only
indigent defendants who end up on death row—are not represented by
skilled, albeit overworked, public defenders, but more often are
represented by court-appointed lawyers, sometimes from law firms that
have contracted with the county to represent these indigents. Some of
these lawyers have little criminal law experience and often no capital
murder experience at all, and they are paid so little by the county or state
that they lack either the incentive or the ability to zealously represent
their clients as they are ethically obligated to do. Those who most
understand the criminal justice system seriously doubt that our justice
system presently is capable of making the life or death decisions with
sufficient reliability to permit us to sleep comfortably at night, as we
execute the thousands of persons now on the death rows in this country.
Indeed, one of the best reasons to doubt that we can properly
determine “death penalty innocence” is our growing realization, with the
advent of DNA, that we are not even able to feel comfortable that we are
excluding from execution those who are entirely factually innocent of
murder, much less of capital murder. And, our error rate has proven
shocking to even some of the most cynical individuals in criminal law.
There is a famous quote by Alan Dershowitz, who is certainly a prodefense sort of guy, and whom I would consider a fairly cynical sort of
guy, who believed and wrote at one point that “almost all criminal
defendants are, in fact guilty,” and that “all criminal defense lawyers,
prosecutors and judges understand and believe” that.12 It is true that
most criminal defendants are guilty. But even he must be shocked, as
we all are, now that we have DNA, to realize how many times we have
erred. Juries have failed; the system has failed, by convicting innocent
people. Illinois has imposed a moratorium on the death penalty that
continues to this day. Why? Because they put 25 people on death row
and it turned out that 13 of the 25 were innocent. That is 50% plus.
So, that means that when we start thinking about the 3,500 people
currently occupying our death rows around this country, we can’t know
how many of them are entirely innocent of murder. If our accuracy rate
12. ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE xxi (1982).
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were 99%, and obviously is isn’t, then that means there are 35 persons
on death row that are entirely innocent and many more that are “death
penalty innocent,” and we of course don’t know how many who have
already been executed fall into one of these categories. And, if our
accuracy rate were 97%, then there are more than 100 people who will
be executed who are entirely innocent. The question then becomes how
many innocent people’s lives are we willing to take, in our name, in
order to kill the genuinely guilty ones? When we include in the
calculations those who are guilty of murder but again, undeserving of
death because they lack that evilness that is required, then it seems to me
the risk of executing the innocent is extremely high.
We must remember that the issue before us is not executing them
versus setting them free. The issue is executing them versus getting rid
of the death penalty and sending people to prison for the rest of their
lives, without the possibility of parole. Since that’s the issue, then when
you consider that there may be at least 100 or more persons innocent on
our death rows, it places a heavy burden on those who would justify the
death penalty. And I, at least, don’t think that burden has been satisfied
yet. Until it is, at a minimum, we ought to impose a death penalty
moratorium until we are more comfortable about what we are doing.
So bottom line, we have, I think, good reason to be deeply troubled
by our criminal justice system. We are punishing people in ways I think
almost impossible to justify on either utilitarian or retributive grounds.
We are punishing the innocent, and we are punishing the guilty more
than they deserve, and more than I think society needs or can afford.
Ultimately, the obligation is on all of us, as voters, as lawyers, as
citizens, to publicize these inequities so other people learn that they
exist, and so that we all can do our best to mend the system.
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